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Abstract 
 
A large literature on the appropriate sequencing of financial liberalization 
suggests that removing capital controls prematurely may contribute to currency 
instability. This paper investigates whether legal restrictions on international capital 
flows are associated with greater currency stability. We employ a comprehensive 
panel data set of 69 developing economies over the 1975–1997 period, identifying 
160 currency crises. We control for macroeconomic, political, and institutional 
characteristics that influence the probability of a currency crisis, employ alternative 
measures of restrictions on international payments, and account for possible joint 
causality between the likelihood of a currency attack and the imposition of capital 
controls. We find evidence that restrictions on capital flows do not effectively insulate 
economies from currency problems; rather, countries with less restrictive capital 
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1. Introduction 
In the aftermath of the East Asian, Russian, and Brazilian currency crises of the 1990s, 
many economists and policymakers have focused on large and volatile capital flows as an 
underlying source of instability to the international financial system. A growing conventional 
wisdom (e.g. Radelet and Sachs, 1998; Stiglitz, 2000) holds that liberalization of international 
capital flows, especially when combined with fixed exchange rates, is either an underlying cause 
or at least a contributing factor behind the rash of currency crises experienced in recent years. A 
common policy prescription under these circumstances is to impose restrictions on capital flows 
and other international payments with the hope of insulating economies from speculative attacks 
and thereby creating greater currency stability.  
An older literature on the optimal sequencing of economic reform also suggests the 
importance of capital controls during the process of development. In this view, liberalization of 
the capital account should not be undertaken until the end of the process; freeing up capital flows 
prematurely before domestic and trade liberalization could lead to economic instability 
(McKinnon, 1973, 1991; Edwards, 1984).  
While there is an extensive empirical literature measuring the effects of capital controls 
on particular economic variables—e.g. capital flows, interest differentials, inflation, and 
output—surprisingly little systemic work has been undertaken regarding their impact on 
exchange rate stability in developing countries.
1 Several papers have investigated the experiences 
of capital controls for a few selected countries (e.g. Edison and Reinhart, 2001a, 2001b; 
Edwards, 1999; Gregorio, Edwards, and Valdes, 2000), while Edwards (1989) has investigated 
the role of capital account restrictions for twenty-four developing countries in the period prior to 
devaluation crises. However, we are aware of no systematic studies that investigate the link 
between capital flow restrictions and exchange rate stability for a broad set of developing 
economies; our sample consists of 69 developing countries over a 23-year period.
2 
The objective of this study is to systematically investigate whether capital account 
restrictions help to insulate developing countries from speculative attack on their currencies. We 
                                                 
1 Dooley (1996) provides a recent survey of the relevant literature. 
2 Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995) find evidence that capital controls may limit the vulnerability 
of industrial countries to speculative attacks. 
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investigate the occurrence of currency crises, the maintenance of capital market restrictions, and 
the link between the two, over time and across countries. More formally, we employ an empirical 
model of the determinants of currency crises as a benchmark from which to investigate the 
marginal effects of capital account restrictions. In particular, we investigate the extent to which 
capital controls effectively insulate countries—i.e., lower the probability—from a currency 
attack.  
A key challenge of our inquiry is to identify key factors that both lead countries to 
impose capital controls and contribute to currency attacks, since there is a risk that excluding 
certain country or economic characteristics from the empirical model might lead to incorrect 
inferences. To this end, we control for a host of economic, political, and institutional factors 
usually associated with currency instability and capital controls. We also develop an empirical 
model of the factors explaining governments’ decisions to maintain capital controls, jointly 
explaining this decision with the onset of a currency attack.  
Section 2 reviews the literature linking capital account restrictions and currency stability. 
Section 3 describes the empirical methodology and data. Section 4 presents an overview of the 
data and shows the frequencies of currency crises, both unconditional and conditional on the 
presence of capital controls. Section 5 presents the results from testing the effect of capital 
market restrictions on the likelihood of currency crises using a probit model. A series of 
robustness and sensitivity tests are undertaken, including utilizing alternative measures of 
payments restrictions. Section 6 motivates and presents estimates of the bivariate probit model 
where currency crises and capital restrictions are jointly determined. Section 7 concludes the 
study.  
  
2.  Capital Controls, Sequence of Financial Liberalization and Instability  
The idea of restricting capital mobility as a means of reducing macroeconomic instability 
has a long history. Indeed, stringent restrictions and limitations on capital flows were the norm 
during the Bretton Woods era, and over much of the immediate post-war period they were 
officially sanctioned by most governments in the large industrial countries and by the 
International Monetary Fund. With the turbulence in exchange markets following the 
introduction of generalized floating, Tobin (1978) argued that a global tax on foreign exchange  
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transactions would reduce destabilizing speculation in international financial markets. After the 
European currency crisis of 1992-93, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993) proposed Tobin taxes to 
discourage short-term speculators from betting against major currencies. In the aftermath of the 
Asia currency crisis of 1997-98, Krugman (1998) proposed limiting capital flows for developing 
countries that were unsuitable for either currency unions or free floating exchange rate regimes. 
In a similar vein, Stiglitz (2000) and Eichengreen (1999) have argued that developing countries 
should manage and limit capital flows under certain market conditions.  
A large literature on the appropriate sequencing of financial liberalization also suggests 
that early lifting of controls on the capital account may destabilize the economy. McKinnon 
(1973, 1993), for example, maintains that decontrol of the capital account should come at the end 
of the reform sequence, following domestic financial liberalization, bank reform, and trade 
liberalization. In particular, McKinnon argues that a rapid inflow of (official or private) capital 
will cause real appreciation of the exchange rate, making it difficult for domestic tradeables 
producers “to adjust to the removal of protection” (1993, p. 117). Thus, “[a] big injection of 
capital at the time the liberalization occurs finances an unusual increase in imports while 
decreasing exports and throws out the wrong long-run price signals in private markets” (ibid., see 
also Edwards 1984, pp. 3–4).  
On the other hand, capital controls may also have a destabilizing effect. Restrictions on 
the international capital account may in fact lead to a net capital outflow and precipitate 
increased financial instability. Dooley and Isard (1980) point out that controls preventing 
investors from withdrawing capital from a country act like a form of investment irreversibility: 
by making it more difficult to get capital out in the future, controls may make investors less 
willing to invest in a country. Following this reasoning, Bartolini and Drazen (1997a, b) show 
that imposing capital controls can send a signal of inconsistent and poorly designed future 
government policies.  
Capital controls may also be ineffective and distortionary. Edwards (1999), for example, 
argues that legal capital restrictions frequently prove ineffective, and are easily sidestepped by 
domestic and foreign residents and firms. He documents how capital controls may lead to 
economic distortions and government corruption that in turn contribute to economic instability.  
Several empirical papers have investigated the experiences with capital controls of 
selected developing countries. Edison and Reinhart (2001a) focus on the recent experiences of  
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Malaysia and Thailand
3, while Edwards (1999) and Gregorio, et al. (2000) examine Chile. In 
general, these studies have found little effect of capital controls in averting currency crises, at 
least not without other supporting economic policies. Using various econometric tests and a 
detailed case study of Chilean controls imposed in the 1980s, for example, Edwards (1999) finds 
that  “…the relative absence of contagion effect on Chile [during the currency crises of the 
1990s] is due to its sturdy banking regulation and not to its capital controls policy” (p. 22). This 
finding is supported by Edwards’ (1989) analysis of the role of capital controls in thirty-nine 
devaluation episodes for twenty-four developing countries over the period 1961-82. He finds that 
countries typically intensified their control programs in the year before devaluation, and 
concludes that “[a]t most one can argue that these heightened impediments to trade managed to 
slow down the unavoidable balance of payments crisis” (pp. 189–90). 
Other studies provide a more mixed view of the effects of capital controls on the factors 
contributing to currency pressures in developing countries. On the one hand, Bartolini and 
Drazen (1997a), who survey a number of episodes of capital account liberalization, find that the 
easing of restrictions on capital outflows often represented early ingredients of a broad set of 
reforms (including the lifting of various elements of financial repression) and frequently led to 
large capital inflows. On the other hand, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995), investigating the 
effects of restrictions on capital flows in a panel of industrial and developing economies, find 
that capital controls have a significant negative effect on foreign borrowing, interpreting their use 
as a means of enforcing financial repression of the economy. They also find that capital controls 
are associated with lower domestic interest rates, consistent with the view that they limit 
international arbitrage in asset markets. However, they do not investigate the link between 
capital restrictions and the likelihood of currency crises. 
We are aware of no empirical studies that systematically investigate the link between 
capital controls (or international payments restrictions generally) and currency stability for a 
broad sample of developing economies. Our study fills this void. Another contribution of our 
work is to enhance understanding of the empirical factors explaining both currency crises and 
capital account restrictions, and causal linkages between the two phenomena.  
                                                 
3 Edison and Reinhart (2001b) also include Brazil and Spain in their analysis.  
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In focusing on the effects of international capital controls per se, however, we do not 
directly address the broader issue of the optimal sequencing of economic reforms and 
liberalization. Measuring the specific pattern and dynamics involved in implementing the 
different phases of a broad program of economic reform  (e.g. domestic versus external, financial 
versus real reforms) for a large sample of developing countries is a difficult task, one that we do 
not undertake in this study. Nevertheless, by analyzing the extent to which a country that has 
external controls in place experiences more or less currency instability, our analysis provides 
insight into the extent to which such controls can limit a country’s vulnerability to external 
shocks as broader reforms are undertaken.
4  
 
3.  Data and Methodology 
3.1  Defining Currency Crises  
Our indicator of currency crises is constructed from “large” changes in an index of currency 
pressure, defined as a weighted average of monthly real exchange rate changes
5  and monthly 
(percent) reserve losses.
6  Following convention (e.g. Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999), the weights 
attached to the exchange rate and reserve components of the currency pressure index are 
inversely related to the variance of changes of each component over the sample for each 
                                                 
4 In Section 5, we do consider domestic financial restrictions as an alternative measure of controls and 
utilize it in a robustness check of our results.  
5 Real exchange rate changes are defined in terms of the trade-weighted sum of bilateral real exchange 
rates (constructed in terms of CPI indices, line 64 of the IFS) against the U.S. dollar, the German mark, 
and the Japanese yen, where the trade-weights are based on the average of bilateral trade with the 
United States, the European Union, and Japan in 1980 and 1990 (from the IMF’s Direction of Trade). 
Most panel studies of currency crises define the currency pressure measure in terms of the bilateral 
exchange rate against a single foreign country. For example, Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998) 
and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) measure the real exchange rate for all of the developing countries in 
their sample against the U.S. dollar. In defining the effective rate in terms of the three major nations 
likely to be the main trading partners of most developing countries, our approach provides a broader 
measure than these other studies and is computationally easier to construct than a multilateral exchange 
rate measure defined in terms of all of a country’s trading partners. Possible alternatives, such as the 
effective exchange rate measures constructed by the IMF, OECD, and others, are not available for a 
broad sample of developing countries.  
6  Ideally, reserve changes should be scaled by the level of the monetary base or some other money 




7 The exchange rate and reserve data are drawn from the International Monetary Fund’s 
International Financial Statistics CD-ROM (lines ae and 1l.d, respectively).  
Our measure presumes that any nominal currency changes associated with exchange rate 
pressure should affect the purchasing power of the domestic currency, i.e. result in a change in 
the real exchange rate (at least in the short run). This condition excludes some large 
depreciations that occur during high inflation episodes, but it avoids screening out sizable 
depreciation events in more moderate inflation periods for countries that have occasionally 
experienced periods of hyperinflation and extreme devaluation.
8 Large changes in exchange rate 
pressure are defined as changes in our pressure index that exceed the mean plus 2 times the 
country-specific standard deviation, provided that it also exceeds 5 percent.
9 The first condition 
insures that any large (real) depreciation is counted as a currency crisis, while the second 
condition attempts to screen out changes that are insufficiently large in an economic sense 
relative to the country-specific monthly change of the exchange rate. 
 
3.2  Measuring Restrictions on International Payments 
Our main focus is on the effects of restrictions on international capital flows. The 
underlying source for our measures of external restrictions is the IMF’s Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (EAER). A country is classified as either 
“restricted” (value of unity) or “liberalized” (value of zero) depending on the existence of 
controls on the capital account at year-end. Specifically, for the 1975-94 period the EAER coded 
countries (published in the reports through 1995) for the existence (or not) of “restrictions on 
                                                 
7 Our currency pressure measure of crises does not include episodes of defense involving sharp rises in 
interest rates. Data for market-determined interest rates are not available for much of the sample period 
in many of the developing countries in our dataset.  
8 This approach differs from that of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), for example, who deal with episodes 
of hyperinflation by separating the nominal exchange rate depreciation observations for each country 
according to whether or not inflation in the previous 6 months was greater than 150 percent, and they 
calculate for each sub-sample separate standard deviation and mean estimates with which to define 
exchange rate crisis episodes. 
9  Other studies defining the threshold of large changes in terms of country-specific moments include 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999); Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998); and Esquivel and Larrain 
(1998). Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) use a three standard deviation cut-off. While the choice of cut-
off point is somewhat arbitrary, Frankel and Rose (1996) suggest that the results are not very sensitive 
to the precise cut-off chosen in selecting crisis episodes. 
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payments for capital transactions.” From 1996, the EAER (starting with the 1997 Annual Report) 
reported 10 separate categories for controls on capital transactions (11 categories in the 1998 
Annual Report). We defined the capital account to be restricted for the 1996-97 observations (i.e. 
not liberalized) if controls were in place in 5 or more of the EAER sub-categories of capital 
account restrictions and “financial credit” was one of the categories restricted.
10   
In our sensitivity tests, we also consider three alternative measures of restrictions on 
international payments and one measure of restrictions on domestic financial institutions. 
Specifically, we consider: (i) a dichotomous a measure of the requirement to surrender or 
repatriate export proceeds;
 11 (ii) a dichotomous measure of restrictions placed on the current 
account of the balance of payments; (iii) an overall balance of payments controls measure, 
defined as a simple average of dichotomous indices of capital account restrictions, requirements 
to surrender or repatriate export receipts, and the presence of an official system of multiple 
exchange rates;
12 and (iv) a measure of domestic financial controls, defined as official 
restrictions on bank deposit interest rates.
13  
 
3.3  Determinants of Currency Crises  
An important part of our work is to identify appropriate control variables in our 
multivariate probit models. We want to ensure that empirical links between external controls and 
currency crises are not spurious, attributable to variables omitted from the probit regressions. 
The theoretical and empirical literature has identified a vast array of variables potentially 
                                                 
10 The 11 classifications under capital restrictions reported in the 1998 EAER were controls on: (1) capital 
market securities, (2) money market instruments, (3) collective investment securities, (4) derivatives 
and other instruments, (5) commercial credits, (6) financial credits, (7) guarantees, sureties, and 
financial backup facilities, (8) direct investment, (9) liquidation of direct investment, (10) real estate 
transactions, and (11) personal capital movements. 
11 Note that, for the 1975-94 period EAER coded countries (published in the reports through 1995) for the 
existence (or not) of “surrender or repatriation requirement for export proceeds.” For 1995 on, the 
EAER began (with the 1996 Annual Report) to disaggregate controls on export proceeds as follows: 
“repatriation requirements for export proceeds” and “surrender requirements for export proceeds.” We 
use the union of these measures for the 1996-97 observations. 
12 This measure of balance of payments controls has been employed by Bartolini and Drazen (1997b). 
13 Data on deposit interest rate restrictions is from Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) and was 
augmented to cover additional countries with information from Williamson and Mahar (1998), 
Honohan (2000), Galbis (1993), and other IMF studies. 
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associated with currency crises (see, e.g. Frankel and Rose, 1996; Kaminsky, Lizondo, and 
Reinhart, 1998; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). The choice of explanatory variables in our 
benchmark model for the analysis was determined by the questions we posed earlier, the 
availability of data, and previous results found in the literature. We postulate a “canonical” 
model of currency crises in order to form a basic starting point to investigate the effects of 
capital controls. The main source of the macro data is the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics (CD-ROM).  
Our basic canonical model consists of five macroeconomic control variables that are 
lagged to limit simultaneity problems. (Data employed in extensions of the benchmark model are 
discussed in Section 5.2.) These variables are the log ratio of broad money to foreign reserves 
(lines 34 plus 35 divided by 1ld times ae), domestic credit growth (line 32), the current account 
to GDP ratio (line 78ald times xrrf divided by 99b) real GDP growth (line 99b.r or 99b.p), and 
real exchange rate overvaluation.
14  
We expect the growth rate of M2/foreign reserves to be relatively high prior to a currency 
crisis. A rise in the M2/foreign reserves ratio implies a decline in the foreign currency backing of 
the short-term domestic currency liabilities of the banking system. This would make it difficult 
to stabilize the currency if sentiment shifts against it. Similar reasoning suggests that a larger 
current account surplus-to-GDP ratio would be expected to lessen the likelihood of a currency 
crisis, while rapid credit growth would be anticipated to precede a currency crisis. We also 
expect relatively large exchange rate overvaluation and declining real output growth to be 
associated with increased likelihood of a currency crisis. Substantially overvalued exchange rates 
may lead to the expectation that a large adjustment may occur, and declining real GDP growth 
may signal worsening economic conditions and undermine investor confidence in home-country 
investment opportunities.  
      
                                                 
14 Following Kaminsky et al (1998) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), among others, we construct the 
degree of real exchange rate overvaluation from deviations from a fitted trend in the real trade-weighted 
exchange rate index, where the exchange rate index we fit is the annual average of the monthly series  
used in constructing the exchange rate component of our currency pressure index (see footnote 5). As 
reported in Section 5.1, we also consider other measures of overvaluation as a robustness check.   
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3.4  Data Sample and Measurement Concerns 
Our data sample is determined by the theoretical determinants of currency market 
volatility and by the availability of data. We do not confine our analysis to countries 
experiencing currency crises. That is, we include developing countries that both did and did not 
experience a severe currency crisis/speculative attack during the 1975-97 sample period. Using 
such a broad control group allows us to make inferences about the conditions and characteristics 
distinguishing countries encountering crises and others managing to avoid crises.  
The minimum data requirements to be included in our study are that GDP are available 
for a minimum of 10 consecutive years over the period 1975-97. This requirement results in a 
sample of 69 developing countries.
15 We use annual crisis observations in our analysis. While we 
employ monthly data for our (real) exchange rate pressure index to identify currency crises and 
date each by the year in which it occurs, using annual data enables inclusion of a relatively large 
number of countries. 
For each country-year in our sample, we construct binary measures of currency crises, as 
defined above (1 = crisis, 0 = no crisis). A currency crisis is deemed to have occurred for a given 
year if the change in currency pressure for any month of that year satisfies our criteria (i.e. two 
standard deviations above the mean as well as greater than five percent in magnitude). To reduce 
the chances of capturing the continuation of the same currency crisis episode, we impose 
windows on our data. In particular, after identifying each “large” monthly change in currency 
pressure, we treat any large changes in the following 24-month window as a part of the same 
currency episode and skip the years of that change before continuing the identification of new 
crises. With this methodology, we identify 160 currency crises over the 1975-97 period. 
Appendix A lists the countries included in the sample and corresponding currency crisis dates, if 
any.  
Appendix B reports the periods for which international payments controls  (either in the 
form of capital account, export receipt, or current account restrictions) and domestic finance 
restrictions were not in  place, i.e. periods of liberalization, for the countries in the sample. It is 
interesting to note that the measures differ somewhat in indicating the presence of controls for 
                                                 
15 Our developing country sample excludes major oil-exporting countries.  
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individual countries, but usually at least one measure picks up commonly recognized episodes of 
liberalization.  
For example, the IMF measure of capital controls does not catch the liberalization 
episodes of Argentina and Brazil in the late 1970s. However, the other measures, such as the 
presence of current account restrictions and the measure of domestic financial repression, do 
capture these experiences. Argentina liberalized its current account during 1977-81 and from 
1993 on (along with the capital account) and domestic interest rates were liberalized over 1977-
82 (but later restricted again until 1987). The measure of domestic interest rate controls indicates 
Brazil financially liberalized during 1976-78, reverted to restrictions in 1979, and liberalized 
again after 1988.  
Thus, no one measure may adequately capture all of the nuances in the extent to which 
controls are present for any given country or point in time. Taken overall, however, we feel that 
the set of measures we employ do an adequate job in capturing the financial control regime in 
place during the occurrence of currency crises for a broad panel of countries. 
We conclude this section by acknowledging that the measures of capital controls, current 
account restrictions, and other restrictions on balance of payments flows published by the IMF 
are somewhat crude. By providing only a dichotomous indication of the existence of controls, 
they are limited in their ability to measure the extent to which restrictions are applied and 
enforced. They also do not distinguish between controls on inflows vs. outflows, and hence do 
not help address the ongoing debate about the efficacy of controls or taxes on capital inflows, as 
in the case of Chile. However, the IMF measures are the only source of data available that can be 
collected with some consistency across a broad group of developing countries and over a 
reasonably long period of time. This is a constraint faced by any panel study in this literature.
 16  
Concerns about measurement should be allayed by our use of a range of restriction indicators.  
 
                                                 
16 See Edison et al (2002) for a comparison of different measures of capital controls in the context of an 
analysis of the effects of capital account liberalization on long-run economic growth.  
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4.  Descriptive Statistics and Conditional Frequencies 
4.1  Descriptive Statistics on Currency Crises and Capital Controls 
Table 1 shows the occurrence of currency crises and capital controls over the 1975-97 
period, and by 5-year intervals (except for the 1995-97 sub-sample). The table reports the 
unconditional frequency of currency crises and presence of capital controls  (number of “crisis” 
or “controls in place” observations, divided by the total number of observations).  
The 69 developing countries in our dataset experienced 160 currency crises over the 
1975-97 period, implying a frequency of 11.7 percent of the available country-year observations. 
Crises were least frequent during the 1975-79 period (9.9 percent average frequency) and most 
frequent during the 1985-89 period (14.3 percent frequency). In our sample, the recent spate of 
currency crises around the world is not an uncommon event, and does not indicate a rise in the 
frequency of currency crises over time.
17 
Table 1 also reports the frequency of restrictions on capital flows during the period. Most 
of the time capital controls were in place in developing economies (83.4 percent of the 
observations). Although this frequency was always high during the sample period, it rose 
noticeably from 1975 through 1989 and then declined in the 1990s. The high point was an 
average frequency of 89.0 percent during 1985-89, and the low point was 76.4 percent during 
1995-97.  
 
4.2  Currency Crises: Frequencies Conditional on Capital Controls 
Table 2 shows the frequency of currency crises conditional upon a country’s having 
restricted capital flows. This table sheds light directly upon the main question of interest: 
whether restrictions on capital flows affect the probability of a currency crisis. To take account 
of the possibility that controls are implemented in response to a crisis, we report results 
conditional on the presence of controls at the end of the year prior to a crisis as well as at the end 
                                                 
17 Currency crises were most frequent in Africa (16.2 percent frequency), and least frequent in Asia (9.6 
percent). Despite recent high profile currency crises in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Korea, the 
developing economies in Asia have been less frequently affected by currency instability. 
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of the year in which a crisis occurs.
2   statistics for tests of the null hypothesis of independence 
between the frequency of crises and the presence of controls are also presented. 
The most striking result from Table 2 is that the country-year observations associated 
with more restrictions on capital flows have substantially higher frequencies of currency crises 
than those observations where no controls were in place. Specifically countries with restricted 
capital flows had crises contemporaneously 12.7 percent of the time, compared to 6.8 percent for 
those not having restrictions. The 
2  statistics reject the null of independence and indicate that 
this difference is significant (at better than 5 percent). The difference in currency crisis frequency 
according to whether the capital account restrictions were in place or not in the preceding year is 
smaller (12.5 percent versus 8.0 percent), but is still significant at the 10 percent level. This is 
suggestive prima facie evidence that controls may not be effective and, indeed, may increase the 
likelihood of a currency crisis (e.g. Bartolini and Drazen, 1997a). It suggests that the presence of 
capital controls does not reduce a country’s exposure to currency instability. 
 
5. Estimation  Results 
Our use of probit models allows us to go beyond the conditional frequencies reported in 
the previous section and to focus on the contribution of payment restrictions to currency crises, 
while controlling for other macroeconomic and institutional factors that vary across time and 
country. We estimate the probability of currency crises using a multivariate probit model for our 
data set of developing countries over the 1975-97 period. We observe that either a country at a 
particular time (observation t) is experiencing the onset of a crisis (i.e. the binary dependent 
variable, say yt, takes on a value of unity), or it is not (yt = 0). The probability that a crisis will 
occur, Pr(yt = 1), is hypothesized to be a function of a vector of characteristics associated with 
observation t, xt , and the parameter vector ß. The likelihood function of the probit model is 
constructed across the n observations (the number of countries times the number of observations 
for each country) and the log of the function  
      
n
t t t t t x F y x F y L
1
' ' )) ( 1 ln( ) 1 ( ) ( ln ln    
is then maximized with respect to the unknown parameters using non-linear maximum 
likelihood. The function F(.) is the standardized normal distribution.  
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In these equations we employ a 24-month window following the onset of a crisis (i.e. 
episode of exchange rate pressure), as discussed in Section 3.4, and we eliminate from the 
dataset these observations. Following Eichengreen and Rose (1998), we use a weighted-probit 
regression where the weight is GDP (in dollars) per capita. Countries with higher GDP per capita 
generally have more reliable data, and the observations are correspondingly given greater weight 
in the analysis. An implication of this specification is that more importance is attached to 
relatively high income developing economies.  
In each table we report the effect of a one-unit change in each regressor on the probability 
of a crisis (expressed in percentage points so that .01=1%), evaluated at the mean of the data. We 
include the associated z-statistics in parentheses; these test the null of no effect. Note that the 
sample size of the probit analysis varies depending on the set of variables considered.  
We also report various diagnostic measures. The in-sample probability forecasts are also 
evaluated with “pseudo” R
2 statistics. For dependent binary variables, it is natural to ask what 
fraction of the observations are “correctly called,” where, for example, a crisis episode is 
correctly called when the estimated probability of crisis is above a given cut-off level and a crisis 
in fact occurs. Greene (2000) points out the chosen cut-off point should reasonably differ 
depending on the unconditional probability of the event and problem at hand. For our “goodness-
of-fit” statistics we consider two different probability cut-offs: 25 percent and 10 percent. These 
cut-offs bracket the unconditional crisis frequency of roughly 12 percent (see Table 1). 
 
5.1  Benchmark Model Estimates  
Table 3 reports the results from the benchmark probit equations without and with 
(lagged) macroeconomic factors to explain the likelihood of the onset of a currency crisis in any 
given year, controlling for the presence of capital account restrictions. The inclusion of the 
macroeconomic variables reduces the sample range from 1174 to 921 observations. Columns (1) 
and (2) report results of including contemporaneous capital controls; columns (3) and (4) report 
the corresponding results for capital controls in place during the preceding year. Our main 
interest is in the latter. 
The benchmark equations (with the macroeconomic variables) explain a substantial 
faction of the currency crises in our sample. Focusing on column (4), the pseudo R-squared is 35 
percent and the percentage of observations correctly predicted is 82 (56) percent when the  
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probability threshold is 25 percent (10 percent). All of the macroeconomic controls have the 
expected signs and, except for lagged credit growth, are significant at the 1 percent level. A high 
M2/reserves ratio, current account deficits, overvalued real exchange rates
18, and sluggish GDP 
growth are significant leading indicators of the onset of a currency crisis.  
Consistent with the conditional frequencies (Table 2), these results indicate a statistically 
significant and economically meaningful negative link between liberalization and the likelihood 
of a currency crisis. This result holds when either the contemporaneous or lagged value of capital 
account restrictions is included. After controlling for macroeconomic factors, the likelihood of a 
currency crisis in developing economies appears to increase by 5.2 percent (8.4 percent) when 
capital controls were in place during the previous (current) year. When macroeconomic controls 
are not included, the estimates are substantially higher.  
 
5.2  Sensitivity Analysis: Additional Macroeconomic and Political Determinants 
Table 4a shows the sensitivity of the benchmark model estimates to the inclusion of 
additional macroeconomic and political variables in the regressions. The objective is to control 
for a variety of economic and political factors that might help distinguish those countries that 
tend to be more prone to currency crises from those experiencing greater stability. Our main 
concern here is that excluding one or several explanatory variables that are highly correlated with 
both currency crises and the decision to maintain capital controls could bias the estimates in the 
benchmark model. (Issues of joint determination are considered in Section 6.)  
The “twin crisis” phenomenon suggests that a domestic banking crisis could make a 
speculative attack on the currency more likely (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Glick and 
Hutchison, 2001). Our banking crisis measure (contemporaneous and lagged) is constructed as a 
binary variable, with unity indicating the onset of a banking crisis, i.e. first year of a period of 
bank distress and zero otherwise.
19 Column (1) includes contemporaneous and lagged bank 
                                                 
18 An alternative measure of overvaluation, the magnitude of real exchange rate change over the prior 
two-year period (cf. Corsetti et al, 1998) was less significant than our benchmark measure based on 
deviations from trend. However, it did not affect the basic result that capital controls significantly raise 
the probability of currency crises.  
19 We report results using only Caprio and Klingebiel’s (1999) “major” or “systemic” bank crisis; the 
results are similar with their more inclusive measure of crises. 
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crises as additional explanatory variables in the benchmark regression. Contemporaneous bank 
crises are significant at the 10 percent level and are associated with a higher likelihood (about 6 
percent) of the onset of a currency crisis. The point estimate on lagged capital controls is 5.25 
(significant at the 1 percent level).  
The international factors that we consider in our sensitivity tests are the level of U.S. real 
long-term interest rates (line 61..zf minus the percent change in 99b.r over 99b) and the 
possibility of regional contagion in currency crises. The measure of contagion takes on a value of 
unity if a currency crisis has occurred in some other country in the region. Eichengreen and Rose 
(1998) and others have found that high foreign (“Northern”) interest rates increase the likelihood 
of debt repayment and increase pressure on currencies in developing countries. Glick and Rose 
(1999) and others find that contagion, primarily based on regional trade linkages, is an important 
element in the transmission of currency crises internationally. 
Column (2) of Table 4a reports the results from including international factors in the 
benchmark regression. Neither contagion nor high U.S. real interest rates play a significant 
systematic role in helping to predict the onset of currency crises in our sample of developing 
countries. The point estimate on lagged capital controls is robust—above 5 in magnitude and 
significant at the 1 percent level.  
We also consider two political variables in our sensitivity tests—the frequency of change 
in government and the degree of political freedom. These factors also could help to distinguish 
historically unstable countries and economies—those presumably with greater currency 
instability and more frequent imposition of capital controls—from more stable situations. We 
attempt to control for political instability and political conditions by measuring the total number 
of democratic and undemocratic (e.g. coups) changes in government over the period 1970-97, as 
determined from Zarate’s Political Collections website (www.terra.es/personal2/monolith), 
supplemented by information from the Encarta Encyclopedia website (www.encarta.msn.com). 
The political freedom measure is taken from the Freedom House website 
(www.freedomhoouse.org, coded on a scale from 1–3, with 3 indicating the highest degree of 
political freedom).  
Column (3) includes these two political variables in the benchmark model with the 
macroeconomic variables. The number of changes in government is significantly positive, 
indicating that greater political instability raises the likelihood of the onset of a currency crisis.  
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Political freedom, however, is not statistically significant at conventional levels. The point 
estimate on lagged capital controls is again around 5 and statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level.  
 
5.3  Sensitivity Analysis: Alternative Measures of Restrictions on Transactions 
The capital account controls measure is a rather rudimentary measure of balance of 
payments restrictions and, by providing only a dichotomous indication of the existence of 
controls, does not allow one to measure variations in the extent to which controls are applied and 
enforced. As discussed in section 3, we assess the robustness of the benchmark estimates by 
using four alternative measures of balance of payments and financial restrictions.  
The results from these sensitivity tests are reported in Table 4b. In each case, the 
coefficient on the exchange "control" variable is positive and statistically significant (at either the 
1 percent or 5 percent level). The explanatory power of the equations and the estimated 
coefficients of the other explanatory variables in Table 4b are also very similar to the other 
estimated equations.
22 Thus, all of our measures of financial restrictions gives the same result—
countries with restrictions, however measured, are more prone to currency attacks. At a 
minimum, one may conclude that there is no evidence that restrictions on capital flows, balance 
of payments, or domestic financial markets effectively insulate countries from currency 
instability. 
 
                                                 
22 In addition, a fifth measure was constructed: the first principle component of the indices of capital 
account controls, export receipt controls, and multiple exchange rates. The results are almost identical 
to the other results in Table 4b. They are not reported for brevity but are available from the authors 
upon request.  
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6.  Joint Determination of Currency Crises and a Regime of Capital Controls 
We wish to further explore the causal linkages between currency crises and the decisions 
of governments to maintain a system of capital controls. To this end, we estimate a recursive 
bivariate probit equation jointly explaining these two phenomena (see Greene, 2000, Chapter 
19). The first equation explaining the onset of currency crises is our benchmark specification. 
The second equation is our attempt to capture the economic and political factors that make 
countries more likely to maintain a system of restrictions on international capital flows. The 
system is recursive in that capital controls (either contemporaneous or lagged) are treated as a 
determinant of currency crises, but not vice versa.
23 
Several studies have investigated the factors that explain why governments maintain a 
system of capital controls. Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995), Bartolini and Drazen, (1997a, b); 
and Alesina, Grilli, and Milesi-Ferretti (1994), for example, present empirical results on a 
number of possible determinants of capital controls Among other factors, they find countries 
with a higher level of government expenditure, relatively closed to international trade, and with 
large current account deficits are more likely to restrict capital flows. Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti 
(1995) also report evidence that political instability is associated with fewer capital account 
restrictions in developing economies. Bartolini and Drazen (1997b) link a high degree of 
restrictions on international payments in developing economies with high world real interest 
rates—measured as the weighted real interest rate in the G-7 industrial countries—in a yearly 
time-series regression. They view the causality as running from world interest rates to capital 
restrictions: restrictions are removed when the cost of doing so is low, i.e. only a small outflow 
of capital is expected when world interest are low. Edwards (1989), investigating the experiences 
of twenty countries over the 1961-82 period, finds that capital controls are frequently intensified 
in the year prior to the onset of a currency crisis. This suggests that a common set of factors may 
contribute both to the onset of a currency crisis and lead governments to impose or maintain 
capital account restrictions.  
                                                 
23 The recursive structure is necessary to satisfy the logical consistency condition for models of 




Following these studies, we consider a number of potential structural, political, and 
economic determinants of capital controls. In particular, we consider two macroeconomic 
variables, two economic structure variables, and two political variables. The macroeconomic 
variables are the current account (as a percent of GDP) and the level of “Northern” real interest 
rates (proxied by the level of the U.S. real long-term interest rate). We expect that large current 
account surpluses place less pressure on countries to maintain a system of controls on 
international payments. High Northern interest rates, by contrast, make capital liberalization—
and integration with world capital markets—more costly in terms of the service of domestic 
government debt (Bartolini and Drazen, 1997a). The maintenance of capital controls in this 
circumstance would be expected.  
The economic structure factors considered are the relative size of government spending 
and openness to world trade. Countries with high levels of government spending may both be 
more prone to currency instability and more likely to impose some form of exchange controls. 
High government spending indicates that governments have large funding requirements, and 
have a greater incentive to resort for seignorage finance and capital controls as a source of 
revenue. By contrast, relatively open economies in terms of international trade (measured by the 
sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP) are also more likely to be open to 
international capital flows, and less prone to impose controls. International openness is also 
found by Romer (1993) to be associated with lower inflation rates, that in turn may lead to 
greater economic stability and less pressure for capital controls. Finally, the two political 
explanatory variables included in our model are the total changes in government and the measure 
of political freedom.  
We first estimate the parameters of the bivariate probit model using maximum likelihood, 
with the correlation between disturbances () in the two equations allowed to vary freely.  
measures (roughly) the correlation between currency crises and capital controls after accounting 
for the effects of the included determinants. The low estimated value of  suggests that any 
omitted effects may well be uncorrelated across the two equations of our bivariate model.
24 That 
                                                 
24 The estimated value of  is .16 in the case capital controls affect currency crises contemporaneously 
and .22 when they enter lagged. 
  
19
is, after the direct effect of capital controls on currency crisis is taken account of, the correlation 
of any omitted determinants of crises and controls is low. 
To formally test the significance of , we estimate the model with  fixed at zero. We 
then used the two sets of results to test for the significance of our  estimate against the null that 
 equals zero using a likelihood ratio test, a Wald test, and Lagrange multiplier test.
25 On the 
basis of these tests, we rejected the alternative that  is not equal to zero, and report only results 
with  constrained to equal zero. 
Columns 1a and 1b of Table 5 report the bivariate probit equations where the capital 
control variable enters the two equations contemporaneously. Columns 2a and 2b report the 
bivariate probit equations where the capital control variable enters the two equations lagged one 
year. The results for the currency crisis equations (columns 1a and 2a) are quite similar to the 
standard probit results, both in terms of the overall explanatory power of the equations and the 
point estimates of the coefficients. The point estimates on the capital control variable in the 
bivariate probit equations are very close to the earlier estimates. Lagged capital controls are 
again associated with about a 5 percent rise in the likelihood of a currency crisis.  
As expected, current account surpluses and more open economies are associated with a 
lower likelihood of capital controls. Countries with relative large government sectors are more 
likely to have capital controls. These findings are consistent with Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti 
(1995). Unlike other studies, however, we find that more political instability (changes in 
government) is associated with a lower likelihood of capital controls in developing countries. 
Northern interest rates and political freedom, however, are not statistically significant 
explanatory factors.  
   
7. Concluding  Remarks 
We find that restrictions on capital controls are associated with higher probability of an 
exchange rate crisis. This result is clearly evident in the calculation of conditional frequencies 
and in the context of probit models estimating the likelihood of the onset of a currency crisis 
                                                 
25 The likelihood ratio statistic, distributed as 
2 with one degree of freedom under the null, equaled .23, 
well below the five percent critical value of 3.84. The Wald statistic was .14, also well below the 
critical value of 3.84. The Lagrange multiplier statistic was .45, which was consistent.  
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where account is taken of a host of macroeconomic and institutional factors. We find no 
evidence that countries with no or few restrictions on the capital account are more prone to 
speculative attacks. 
We are aware of concerns about the quality of data on capital controls used in our 
analysis. Measures of capital controls, current account restrictions, and other restrictions on the 
balance of payments published by the IMF are rough proxies for controls and do not pick up 
many nuances in the extent of controls over time and across countries; nor do they clearly 
distinguish between restrictions on capital inflows and outflows. However, they are the only 
source of data available that can be collected with some consistency across a broad group of 
developing countries and over a reasonably long period of time—a constraint faced by every 
study in this literature. Moreover, this constraint may not be too problematic, since a close 
inspection of our alternative measures of financial restrictions indicates that almost all commonly 
recognized episodes are identified by at least one of the measures. Furthermore, the results are 
not sensitive to the particular measure of financial restrictions used. 
This evidence is supportive, of course, of previous work questioning the effectiveness of 
capital controls in insulating countries from speculative attacks on inconsistent policy regimes.
26 
It also indicates that, in the context of the sequencing literature on economic reform, an 
environment where the capital account is liberalized does not appear to be more vulnerable to 
exchange rate instability. Surprisingly, the opposite appears to be the case. Countries without 
capital controls appear to have greater exchange rate stability and fewer speculative attacks. This 
result holds even when taking account of macroeconomic factors—inconsistent policy regimes—
that lead to speculative attacks, as well as country-specific political and institutional factors that 
induce countries to maintain a system of capital controls in the first place.  
 
                                                 
26 Dooley (1996), summarizing the literature, concludes: “Capital controls or dual exchange rate systems 
have been effective in generating yield differentials, covered for exchange rate risk, for short periods of 
time, but they have little power to stop speculative attacks on regimes that were seen by the market as 
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Currency crisesa  11.7 9.9  12 14.3  11.8 9.7 
  (Number of crises)  (160)  (26) (34) (43) (38) (19) 
Capital controlsb  83.8 79.4 84.2 89.0 86.6 76.2 
 
a  Number of crises divided by total country-years with available data. Number of crises in parentheses. 
b  Number of country-years with capital controls in place at end of year divided by total country-years with available data  
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Table 2. Currency Crises, Frequency Conditional on Capital Controls (in percent) 
 
 
  Yes a  No b  2 c 
Controls in place during 
current year?  12.7  6.8  6.11** 
Controls in place during 
previous year?  12.5  8.0  3.50* 
 
a  Number of currency crises for which capital controls in place at end of current or previous year, divided by total number of 
country-years with controls in place. 
b  Number of currency crises for which capital controls not in place at end of current or previous year, divided by total number of 
country-years with controls not in place. 
c  Null hypothesis of independence between frequency of currency crises and controls is distributed as 2(1). ** and * indicate 
rejection of null at 5 and 10 percent significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 3. Currency Crises: Probit Benchmark 
Explanatory Variable (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Capital account controls t    11.49** 8.38**     
  (5.32) (3.70)     
Capital account controls t-1      8.62***  5.24*** 
     (4.02)  (2.31) 
Log(M2/Reserves) t-1    1.85**    2.21*** 
   (2.11)    (2.44) 
Credit growth t-1    0.02    0.03 
   (1.29)    (1.37) 
Current account/GDP t-1    -0.34***    -0.37*** 
   (2.58)    (2.69) 
Real overvaluation t-1    0.11***    0.11*** 
   (3.21)    (3.25) 
Real GDP growth t-1    -0.39**    -0.43*** 
   (2.28)    (2.38) 
Summary statistics 
No. of Crises  157  120  157  120 
No. of Observations  1174  921  1173  921 
Log likelihood  -370.8  -268.9  -376.9  -273.2 
Pseudo-R2 0.33  0.36  0.31  0.35 
Goodness-of-fit (25% cutoff) a 
% of obs. correctly called  87  82  87  82 
% of crises correctly called  0  18  0  15 
% of non-crises correctly 
called  100 92  100  92 
Goodness-of-fit (10% cutoff) a 
% of obs. correctly called  28  52  27  56 
% of crises correctly called  90  80  89  80 
% of non-crises correctly 
called  18 48  18  52 
 
Note:  The table reports the change in the probability of a crisis in response to a 1 unit change in the variable 
evaluated at the mean of all variables (x 100, to convert into percentages) with associated z-statistic (for 
hypothesis of no effect) in parentheses below. Results significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels are 
indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. Constant included, but not reported. Observations are weighted by 
real GDP per capita (in dollars).  
 
a  Goodness-of-fit statistics defined respectively as (A + D) / (A + B + C + D), A / (A + C), and D / (B + D), 
where A(C) denote number of crises with predictions of crises above (below) probability cutoff and B (D) 
denote number of corresponding non-crises with predictions of crises above (below) the cutoff.  
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 Table 4a. Sensitivity Analysis: Additional Macroeconomic and Political Determinants   
Explanatory Variable (1)  (2)  (3) 
Capital acct. controls t-1  5.25***  5.42***  5.01** 
   (2.33)  (2.39)  (2.23) 
Log(M2/Reserves) t-1  2.52***  2.07***  2.34*** 
   (2.81)  (2.32)  (2.55) 
Credit growth t-1  0.02  0.02  0.02 
   (0.96)  (1.30)  (1.25) 
Current account/GDP t-1  -0.27**  -0.33***  -0.37*** 
   (1.96)  (2.44)  (2.72) 
Real overvaluation t-1  0.09***  0.09***  0.11*** 
   (2.55)  (2.58)  (3.16) 
Real GDP growth t-1  -0.43***  -0.39**  -0.41** 
   (2.43)  (2.16)  (2.30) 
Contagion t    2.73   
   (1.18)   
U.S. real interest rate t-1    0.62   
     (1.45)   
Change of government  t      3.83* 
       (1.73) 
Freedom t-1      -1.55 
       (1.16) 
Bank crisis t  5.75*     
   (1.65)     
Bank crisis t-1 or t-2  4.68     
   (1.48)     
Summary statistics 
No. of Crises  119  120  120 
No. of Observations  912  921  921 
Log likelihood  -265.3  -271.3  -271.1 
Pseudo-R2 0.36  0.36  0.36 
Goodness-of-fit (25% cutoff) a 
% of obs. correctly called  82  81  83 
% of crises correctly called  15  17  15 
% of non-crises correctly called  93  91  93 
Goodness-of-fit (10% cutoff) a 
% of obs. correctly called  56  55  57 
% of crises correctly called  75  79  73 
% of non-crises correctly called  53  52  55 
 
       Note:  See  Table  3.  
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  (4) 
 Controls t-1  5.80**  4.63***  8.77***  5.81*** 
    (2.25) (2.52) (2.88) (2.76) 
Log(M2/Reserves) t-1       2.55***  2.79***  2.34***  3.19*** 
    (2.86) (3.19) (2.64) (3.38) 
Credit  growth  t-1  0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
    (0.92) (1.06) (0.56) (0.73) 
Current account/GDP t-1  -0.27**  -0.29**  -0.27*  -0.26 
    (1.97) (2.10) (1.95) (1.49) 
Real overvaluation t-1       0.09*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.06 
    (2.55) (2.36) (2.50) (1.65) 
Real GDP growth t-1  -0.41***  -0.36** -0.39** -0.45*** 
    (2.33) (2.01) (2.20) (2.33) 
Bank Crisis t  5.62  6.01*  5.98*  8.80*** 
    (1.63) (1.71) (1.75) (2.39) 
Bank Crisis t-1 or t-2  4.84  5.19  4.78  6.84** 
    (1.52) (1.62) (1.54) (2.01) 
Summary statistics 
No.  of  Crises  119 119 119 112 
No.  of  Observations  914 914 912 808 
Log  likelihood  -265.6 -265.0 -263.9 -246.7 
Pseudo-R2  0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 
Goodness-of-fit (25% cutoff) a 
% of obs. correctly called  83  82  82  80 
% of crises correctly called  17  15  13  21 
% of non-crises correctly called  93  92  92  90 
Goodness-of-fit (10% cutoff) a 
% of obs. correctly called  57  54  57  53 
% of crises correctly called  72  70  71  78 
% of non-crises correctly called  55  51  55  49 
      
 
Note:  See Table 3. Alternative control measures: export receipt controls defined by presence of surrender or 
repatriation requirements for export receipts; current account controls; balance of payments controls 
defined as average (i.e. 0, .33, .67, or 1) of presence of capital account controls, export receipt controls, 














Capital acct. controls t  8.34***       
   (3.59)       
Capital acct. controls t-1      5.20**   
       (2.14)   
Log(M2/Reserves) t-1  1.94**    2.30***   
   (2.11)    (2.43)   
Credit growth t-1  0.02    0.02   
   (1.31)    (1.40)   
Current account/GDP t-1  -0.34*** -1.05***  -0.37*** -1.26*** 
   (2.55)  (3.53)  (2.64)  (4.16) 
Real overvaluation t-1  0.11***    0.11***   
   (3.41)    (3.48)   
Real GDP growth t-1  -0.40**    -0.43***   
   (2.25)    (2.37)   
Govt. Spdg/GDP t-1    1.21***    0.80* 
     (2.83)    (1.79) 
Openness  t     -0.29***    -0.27*** 
     (6.48)    (6.96) 
U.S. real interest rate  t-1    -0.40    -1.14 
     (0.51)    (1.50) 
Total changes of government      -2.24***    -2.48*** 
     (2.55)    (2.93) 
Freedom t-1    -2.11    -4.70 
     (0.73)    (1.64) 
Summary statistics 
No. of crises/presence of controls  117  721  117  724 
No. of observations  892    892   
Log likelihood  -708.1    -708.0   
McFadden-R2 0.35    0.35   
Goodness-of-fit (25% cutoff) a 
% of obs. correctly called  82    82  
% of crises correctly called  19    16  
% of non-crises correctly called  92    92  
Goodness-of-fit (10% cutoff) a 
% of obs. correctly called  47    52  
% of crises correctly called  85    84  
% of non-crises correctly called  42    47  
Note: See Table 3. Results from estimate of bivariate (recursive) probit model for currency crises and (current 
or lagged) capital controls with cross-equation correlation between disturbances restricted to 0.  
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Appendix A. Currency Crisis Episodes 
Argentina  1975, 1982, 1989 
Bangladesh 1975 
Belize  
Bolivia  1981, 1983, 1988, 1991 
Botswana 1984,  1996 
Brazil  1982, 1987, 1990, 1995 
Burundi  1976, 1983,1986, 1989, 1997 
Cameroon  1982, 1984, 1994 
Chile 1985 
China, P.R.: Hong Kong   
Colombia 1985 
Costa Rica  1981 
Cyprus  
Dominican Republic  1985, 1987, 1990 
Ecuador  1982, 1985, 1988 
Egypt 1979,  1989 
El Salvador  1986, 1990 
Equatorial Guinea  1991, 1994 
Ethiopia 1992 
Fiji 1986 
Ghana  1978, 1983, 1986 
Grenada 1978 
Guatemala 1986,  1989 
Guinea-Bissau 1991,  1996 
Guyana 1987,  1989 
Haiti 1977,  1991 
Honduras 1990 
Hungary 1989,  1994 
India  1976, 1991, 1995 
Indonesia  1978, 1983, 1986, 1997 
Jamaica  1978, 1983, 1990 
Jordan  1983, 1987, 1989, 1992 
Kenya  1975, 1981, 1985, 1993, 1995, 1997 
Korea 1980,  1997 
Lao People’s D. R.  1995 
Madagascar  1984, 1986, 1991, 1994 
Malawi  1982, 1985, 1992, 1994 
Malaysia 1986,  1997  
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Mali 1993 
Malta 1992,  1997 
Mauritius 1979 
Mexico  1976, 1982, 1985, 1994 
Morocco 1983,  1990 
Mozambique 1993,  1995 
Myanmar 1975,  1977 
Nepal  1975, 1981, 1984, 1991, 1995 
Nicaragua 1993 
Nigeria  1986, 1989, 1992 
Pakistan  
Panama  
Paraguay  1984, 1986, 1988, 1992 
Peru  1976, 1979, 1987  
Philippines  1983, 1986, 1997 
Romania 1990 
Sierra Leone  1988, 1990, 1997 
Singapore 1975 
South Africa  1975, 1978, 1984, 1996 
Sri Lanka  1977 
Swaziland  1975, 1979, 1982, 1984 
Syrian Arab Republic  1977, 1982, 1988 
Thailand  1981, 1984, 1997 
Trinidad & Tobago  1985, 1988, 1993 
Tunisia 1993 
Turkey 1978,  1994 
Uganda  1981, 1987, 1989 
Uruguay 1982 
Venezuela  1984, 1986, 1989, 1994 
Zambia 1985,  1994 
Zimbabwe  1982, 1991, 1994, 1997 
 
a  Currency crises defined by criteria described in text, with 24-month exclusion windows imposed. 
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Argentina  1993–  1977-81, 1993–  1993–  1977-82, 1987– 
Bangladesh   1994-95    1989– 
Belize  1981-85 1984-95    
Bolivia  1975-80, 1986-95  1975-80, 1986-95  1997–  1985– 
Botswana    1975-79, 1995, 1997  1987-92   
Brazil     1976-78,  1989– 
Burundi     1989– 
Cameroon   1975-86,  1993-95    1990– 
Chile    1976-81, 1995    1974-81, 1985– 
China, P.R.: Hong Kong  1975–  1975–  1975–  1975 
Colombia     1980– 
Costa Rica  1980-81, 1995–  1975-80, 1994–    1986– 
Cyprus   1993-95    NA 
Dominican Republic    1995     
Ecuador  1975-85, 1988-92, 1995  1975-81, 1993–    1986-87, 1992– 
Egypt   1996–  1994–  1991– 
El  Salvador  1996– 1993– 1996– 1991– 
Equatorial Guinea    1994-95    NA 
Ethiopia      
Fiji   1975-87,  1992-95   1985– 
Ghana   1993-95    1987– 
Grenada   1993-95  1975-78  NA 
Guatemala  1975-79, 1989–  1975-79, 1989–  1975-79  1989– 
Guinea-Bissau     NA 
Guyana   1993–  1996–  1991– 
Haiti   1975–  1975-80,  96–  1995– 
Honduras  1975-79, 1993-95  1975-80, 1993–  1975-77  1990– 
Hungary   1996–    1987– 
India     1991– 
Indonesia 1975-95  1975-76,  1978–  1982–  1983– 
Jamaica  1996– 1996– 1992– 1991– 
Jordan   1979-86,  1997–  1995–  1988– 
Kenya  1996– 1996– 1996– 1991– 
Korea    1978-81, 1988-95    1984-88, 1991– 
Lao People’s D. R.    1996–     
Madagascar   1997–    1985– 

















Malaysia 1975-95  1975–  1982-92  1978– 
Mali   1975-95    
Malta   1994-95    NA 
Mauritius  1996– 1993– 1997– 1981– 
Mexico  1975-81  1975-81, 1987–  1975-81, 1993–  1977-81, 1989– 
Morocco   1993-95    1991– 
Mozambique      
Myanmar     NA 
Nepal   1995    1986– 
Nicaragua  1975-77, 1996–  1975-77, 1993–  1975-77, 1996–  NA 
Nigeria   1986-88    1990-93 
Pakistan     1991– 
Panama  1975– 1975– 1975– NA 
Paraguay  1982-83, 1996–  1978-81, 1992-95  1997–  1991– 
Peru  1978-83, 1993–  1978-83, 1992-95, 1997–  1992–  1980-84, 1990– 
Philippines    1985, 1995   1992–  1981– 
Romania    1992  1991– 
Sierra Leone    1986-91, 1995   1995–  1987– 
Singapore 1978–  1975-96  1978–  1974– 
South Africa    1975-77, 1993-95    1980 
Sri Lanka    1978-79, 1992-95  1992–  1980– 
Swaziland   1975-95    NA 
Syrian  Arab  Republic      
Thailand   1975–    1989– 
Trinidad & Tobago  1994–  1975-81, 1992  1993–  1994– 
Tunisia   1992-95    1987– 
Turkey 1997–  1989-95    1980-82,  1988 
Uganda  1997– 1994– 1995– 1991– 
Uruguay  1978-92, 1996–  1976–  1981, 1996–  1976– 
Venezuela  1975-83, 1996–  1975-82, 1988-92, 1996–  1976-82, 1997–  1981-84, 1991-93, 1996– 
Zambia  1996– 1996– 1996– 1992– 
Zimbabwe    1995  1992– 
 
Note:   “–” indicates liberalization continues until the end of the sample in 1997; blank cell indicates liberalization never 
implemented; NA indicates no data available.  
 
 
 